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Nontechnical Summary
This paper deals with the interaction of central wage bargaining and local wage for-
mation with regard to wage exibility. We show, that there are theoretical reasons to
expect central wage bargaining to aect disproportionately the lower part of the wage
distribution, i.e. workers receiving low wage payments given their known character-
istics. On the other hand, local wage formation, representing rm{specic wage bar-
gaining or incentive wages, may aect disproportionately the upper part of the wage
distribution. Consequently, two kinds of wage exibility need to be distinguished:
wages may not only respond directly to local unemployment, but, even without in-
terregional mobility, they may also respond to national unemployment when there is
centralized wage bargaining.
Following our theoretical considerations, the empirical investigation employs a quantile
regression approach, which allows for a comprehensive study of the impact of unem-
ployment along the entire wage distribution. Using quantile regression techniques
proves natural since the theoretical setting suggests that coecients of local and na-
tional unemployment vary systematically across the wage distribution, and thus, it is
potentially misleading to focus on the conditional mean of the wage distribution as
done in standard regression analysis.
The main dataset used is the regional le of the \IAB{Besch

aftigtenstichprobe", a 1%
random sample from the German social security accounts, reporting characteristics of
employed and unemployed workers in West Germany's districts. The results support
our hypothesis, as employees with relatively low wages have a signicantly lower re-
gional wage exibility than those with relatively high wages. We also nd a negative
and asymmetric impact of national unemployment on wages, which is stronger for
employees with low wages. Both, the lower wage exibility of low wage earners with
respect to regional unemployment and the higher wage exibility of low wage earners
with respect to national unemployment are particularly relevant for the unskilled.
When distinguishing short{ and long{term unemployment, regional long{term unem-
ployment is found to have a much weaker impact on wages than short{term unem-
ployment. Regarding short{term unemployment, there is again an increase of wage
exibility over the wage distribution. On the other hand, national long{term unem-
ployment has a signicant negative impact on wages which is especially relevant in the
lower part of the wage distribution.
As a conclusion, our study implies that central wage bargaining matters for regional
wage exibility in the German case. In the lower part of the wage distribution, we
nd empirical support for suppressed local wage exibility. This eect is particularly
relevant for less educated labor. Our results also suggest that an assessment of cen-
tral wage bargaining should take into account the exibility of wages with respect to
national unemployment. In particular, central wage bargaining may involve a higher
wage exibility for less competitive groups of the labor market.
II
Abstract:
We argue that in labor markets with central wage bargaining wage exibility varies
systematically across the wage distribution: local wage exibility is more relevant
for the upper part of the wage distribution, and exibility of wages negotiated under
central wage bargaining aects the lower part of the wage distribution. Using a random
sample of German social{security accounts, we estimate wage exibility across the
wage distribution by means of quantile regressions. The results support our hypothesis,
as employees with low wages have signicantly lower local wage exibility than high
wage employees. This eect is particularly relevant for the lower educational groups.
On the other hand, employees with low wages tend to have a higher wage exibility
with respect to national unemployment.
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11 Introduction
When economists are asked about the reasons for the European unemployment prob-
lem they often point to labor market rigidities. In particular, the rigidity or insucient
responsiveness of wages to unemployment, are considered to lie at the roots of unem-
ployment (e.g. Siebert, 1997). Yet, there are diculties with this argument:
First, many empirical studies fail to show that wage exibility is lower in the European
countries when compared with North America (cf. Nickell, 1997). Even with regional
data, Blanchower / Oswald (1994) among others managed to establish a \wage curve"
in European countries similar to that of the US. With the background of large and
persistent dierences in the regional unemployment rates in Europe (cf. OECD, 1989)
but convergence in regional unemployment rates in the US (cf. Blanchard / Katz,
1992) the similarity of the \wage curve" is somewhat puzzling. It seems to imply that
the large concentration of unemployment in some European regions is not caused by
insucient wage exibility.
Second, following a large body of literature on wage formation wage exibility should
be regarded as endogenous in the economics of the labor market. This means that
knowledge of the determinants of wage exibility is required before any policy re-
commendations can be given. This might be of particular relevance in the case of
collective wage bargaining, where the degree of centralization can have ambiguous
eects on wage exibility (cf. Calmfors / Drill (1988)). On the one hand, central-
ization of wage bargaining reduces the wage exibility at the level of the industry, the
region, and the rm. On the other hand, central wage bargaining may directly take
into account the national performance of the labor market. The consequence is that
a removal of collective wage bargaining institutions in order to raise wage exibility
could potentially exchange one form of wage rigidity for another.
The two problems concerning the lack of wage exibility as a cause of unemployment
are related. As long as labor market institutions are not introduced into the analysis
of wage exibility, one can hardly expect to identify causes of unemployment. Put
dierently, the failure of empirical studies to nd international dierences in wage
exibility may well be caused by the neglect of labor market institutions. In this
paper, we are concerned about the interaction of central wage bargaining and local
wage formation with regard to wage exibility. We will show that there are theoretical
reasons to expect central wage bargaining to aect mainly the lower end of the (condi-
tional) wage distribution, i.e. workers receiving low wage payments given their known
characteristics. On the other hand, local wage formation, representing rm{specic
wage bargaining or incentive wages, is expected to aect mainly the upper tail of the
wage distribution. Consequently, two kinds of wage exibility need to be distinguished:
wages may not only respond directly to local unemployment, but, even without interre-
gional mobility, they may respond to national unemployment when there is centralized
2wage bargaining. Following our theoretical considerations, the empirical investigation
employs a quantile regression approach, which allows for a comprehensive study of the
impact of unemployment across the wage distribution. Using quantile regression tech-
niques proves natural since the theoretical setting suggests that coecients of local and
national unemployment vary systematically across the wage distribution, and thus, it
is potentially misleading to focus on the (conditional) mean of the wage distribution
as done in standard regression analysis.
As the empirical analysis is concerned with the impact of local unemployment on indi-
vidual wages, inference needs to take into account unobserved characteristics aecting
all observations within the location or the region including adjacent locations. Moul-
ton (1986,1990) emphasized that conventional inference procedures are severely biased
in the presence of unobserved but common group eects. As a methodological novelty
this paper uses a exible Block Bootstrap procedure for inference taking account of
correlation in the error term both within regions and between neighboring regions.
Our results reveal the importance of these eects for standard error estimates.
The main dataset used is the regional le of the \IAB{Besch

aftigtenstichprobe" (IABS{
REG), a 1% random sample from the German social security accounts, reporting
wages, age, education, and other characteristics of employed workers as well as char-
acteristics of unemployed in West Germany's districts. This yields a large set of
observations for individuals in 259 contiguous regions for 15 consecutive years in Ger-
many. When considering central wage bargaining, the German case is of particular
interest. Similar to Scandinavian countries the German system of labor relations en-
tails dierent stages of wage formation: Wage bargaining takes place at the level of
industries between the employers' federation and the union representing the industry's
workers. Until recently this bargaining system proved fairly stable, but due to pro-
longed labor market problems, particularly in East Germany, the system is criticized
for not providing sucient exibility. Although in some industries there are separate
agreements in the regions, the conditions of the agreements show almost no dierences
across regions for major industries (cf. B

uttner, 1998). However, because agreements
determine all aspects of working conditions, such as working time and holidays, and
specic payments, such as bonuses and overtime payments, it is almost impossible to
compute the relevant contract wage of an employee on the basis of publicly available
statistical data. Therefore, the level of negotiated wages for observed individual work-
ers is generally not known in German labor market studies. Yet, some studies using
unique datasets estimate the dierence between actual wages and negotiated wages to
be on average about 7-12 % (cf. Schnabel, 1994, see also Meyer, 1995). To explain the
positive gap between actual wages and negotiated wages the literature puts forward
eciency wages and rm{level wage bargaining (e.g. Schlicht, 1992). This is in line
with the application of the \wage{curve" hypothesis to the German case. However,
even when negotiated wages are endogenous, it can be shown that the gap between
actual and negotiated wages varies over the wage distribution and vanishes at the lower
3end of the wage distribution (see B

uttner, 1998). Put dierently, the lower the wage
paid the more likely is the specic wage oor set by contract wages binding. This
paper takes a broad view on the implication for the wage exibility across the entire
wage distribution. Hence, in taking the institutional aspect of central wage bargaining
into account we contribute to the controversial discussion on wage rigidity in Germany,
for which empirical studies following the \wage{curve" hypothesis report signicant
local exibility (see Blien, 1995, Bellmann / Blien, 1996, and B

uttner, 1999), but the
central wage bargaining system is critized for its rigidity.
The following section shows theoretically the implications on wage exibility when
both local and central wage formation is present. It provides the basis for the empirical
analysis, which is presented in section 3. A nal section summarizes the ndings.
2 Wage Flexibility with Local and Central Wage Formation
In this section the theoretical analysis of wage exibility combines central wage bar-
gaining at the supra{rm level and rm{specic wage formation at the local level.
Various hypothesis have been applied in order to formulate the impact of local labor
market conditions on the wage rate (see Blanchower / Oswald, 1994). Also, there
exists a large body of literature discussing the determinants of wage bargaining (e.g.
Pencavel, 1991), which might also be used to model central wage bargaining. However,
for the present purpose it suces to assume two very simplied reduced{form wage
equations, one determining the collectively negotiated contract wage, and the other
determining the rm{specic local wage. Consider a worker i with occupation in re-
gion r. The worker is paid either according to the terms of the central wage agreement
or receives the local wage, formally:
W
r;i
= max
 
W
L
r;i
; W
C
i

; (1)
whereW
L
r;i
denotes the local wage paid to a worker employed in the considered industry
at location r and W
C
i
denotes the contract wage according to the wage agreement
given the individual characteristics of worker i. According to the maximum operator
in equation (1) wages contracted in central wage agreements dene the oor of the
wage actually paid. The justication in the German setting is that rms tend to pay
the contract wage not only to union members but to all employees (cf. Franz, 1996).
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As the analysis deals with industry{level wage bargaining, the contract wage is not
1
As legal enforcement of contract wages (\Allgemeinverbindlicherkl

arung") is the exception rather
than the rule, the reason might be that when paying non{union members less, employers would create
an incentive for their workers to become union members. However, the view of contract wages as the
oor for paid wages requires employers to be members of the employers' federation. Thus, employers
have an exit option as shown by the failure of the collective labor institutions in East{Germany (cf.
Scheremet, 1995).
4indexed by the region { reecting the view that agreements do not allow for regional
dierentiation.
Following Blanchower / Oswald (1994), the local wage is aected by the regional
rate of unemployment of workers (u
r
) because of eciency wages or rm{specic wage
bargaining, formally:
w
L
r;i
 logW
L
r;i
= 
1
  
1
u
r
+ 
L
i
: (2)
It is assumed that, despite individual dierences in payment, all workers are aected
equally by the regional rate of unemployment. Without going into the details of the
theoretical foundation for the \wage curve", it is obvious that this specication relates
to workers with similar labor supply behaviour. In contrast to the local wage, the
contract wage does not react to the regional unemployment. But, as it is negotiated
at the national level, it reacts to the overall or national rate of unemployment (u):
w
C
i
 logW
C
i
= 
2
  
2
u+ 
C
i
: (3)
At this stage, we have a simple wage determination model with two regimes, a local{
wage regime and a contract{wage regime depending on which of the two wages deter-
mine the actual wage according to equation (1). The basic diculty of the application
of this setting to the observed wages is that we do not know to which regime an ob-
served wage belongs, i.e., in statistical terms, we do not know the sample separation.
This is a consequence of the above mentioned diculties in measuring the contract
wage. Nevertheless, under reasonable assumptions this model of wage determination
exhibits empirical implications on the distribution of wages in the two regimes, in
particular, when the conditional variance of (logarithmic) wages in the contract{wage
regime is lower than in the local{wage regime:
Var
 
w
C
i
j u

< Var
 
w
L
r;i
j u
r

As wage agreements x the wage of certain classied occupations, it would require an
implausibly large number of job categories for industry{level bargaining to violate this
requirement. Also, the lower residual variance in the union sector in other countries is a
common empirical nding (see Freeman, 1980, and Chamberlain, 1994). Furthermore,
the observation of a non{negative gap between wages paid and wages contracted in
the German case (see above) is consistent with a more dispersed distribution of local
wages at least at the right{hand side of the wage distribution.
Then, with lower dispersion of residuals contract{wage regime, what is the consequence
of industry{level wage bargaining for the responsiveness of wages to unemployment?
The answer to this question is that it depends on the level of wages: the wage exibility
at higher wages is systematically dierent from that at lower wages. To make this point
precise, and to show the direction of the dierences in the responsiveness of wages,
we pick dierent points of the wage distribution and analyze whether the impact of
5unemployment varies. In statistical terms, we consider the impact of unemployment
at dierent quantiles of the wage distribution. Given u and u
r
, let the probability to
observe a wage below a certain threshold c be , formally:
 = F
w
( c j u ; u
r
) ) c = q

(w j u; u
r
) ; (4)
where F
w
denotes the cumulative distribution function of wages. Then, c is just the {
quantile of the conditional wage distribution q

(w j u; u
r
). Investigating regional wage
exibility, we inspect the impact of the regional rate of unemployment on this quantile
by total dierentiation of equation (4) while holding constant national unemployment
and the probability at :
0 =
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( c j u ; u
r
)
@u
r
du
r
+
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w
( c j u ; u
r
)
@c
dq

,
dq

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r
=  
@F
w
( c j u ; u
r
) = @u
r
@F
w
( c j u ; u
r
) = @c
: (5)
According to the basic wage{determination model, the probability to observe a wage
below the level c is the probability that the wages in both regimes are jointly below
that level, i.e. formally:
P (w
r;i
 c) = P
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	
:
If we assume a continuous joint distribution of the residuals in the two wage regimes,
this can be formalized by:
F
w
(cju; u
r
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Z
c 
2
+
2
u
 1
Z
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1
+
1
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r
 1
f
 

L
i
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
d
L
i
d
C
i
; (6)
where f denotes the continuous joint density of the residuals. Partial dierentiation
of equation (6) with respect to c and u
r
and insertion into equation (5) yields an
expression for the impact of regional unemployment onto the conditional {quantile
of the wage distribution (cf. appendix for the details of this derivation).
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where f
w
L
 
w
L
r;i
j u
r

is the (marginal) density of the wage in the local{wage regime at
a given regional rate of unemployment. Correspondingly, f
w
C
 
w
C
i
j u

is the density
of the wage in the contract wage regime at a given national rate of unemployment.
P
 
w
C
i
 cjw
L
r;i
= c; u

denotes the probability to observe a local{wage regime at a
given level c of the local wage. Finally, P
 
w
L
r;i
 cjw
C
i
= c; u
r

denotes the probability
6to observe a contract{wage regime at a given level c of the contract wage. According
to equation (7) the impact of regional unemployment on the {quantile of the observed
wages is equal to  
1
times a factor between 0 and 1, which can be interpreted as a
weighted probability that a local{wage regime is observed at c.
If the above distributional assumption is fullled, i.e. if the distribution of wages under
the local{wage regime is more dispersed, one can show the following proposition:
Proposition 1: The observed response of the logarithmic wage to an increase in
regional unemployment tends to zero at lower quantiles of the wage distribution, de-
creases over the wage distribution, and approaches  
1
at higher quantiles.
While a derivation of this proposition for a special case is given in the appendix the
intuition of this proposition is straightforward: If the observed wage is in the lower tail
of the distribution, one can expect that the local wage is small relative to the contract
wage. Therefore, the worker is more likely to be paid according to the contract{wage
regime, and the impact of local unemployment on the local wage is irrelevant for the
observed quantile. Correspondingly, in the upper tail of the wage distribution the
local wage is probably large relative to the contract wage. Thus, we can expect the
worker to be paid according to the local{wage regime, and the impact of regional
unemployment on the local wage governs the observed responsiveness of the wage.
Based on similar reasoning the impact of the national unemployment rate at a given
level of the regional rate of unemployment can be determined. Because, by assumption,
the national rate of unemployment aects the contract wage but not the local wage,
the following proposition holds:
Proposition 2: The observed response of the wage to an increase in the national
rate of unemployment tends to zero at higher quantiles of the wage distribution, but
approaches  
2
at lower quantiles.
Again the appendix contains the details of the proof. The intuition is similar to that
of Proposition 1: At low quantiles of the observed wage distribution, the local wage
is probably small relative to the contract wage. Hence, the worker is expected to be
paid according to the contract{wage regime. An increase in national unemployment
thus aects the observed wage. At high quantiles of the wage distribution, however,
the local{wage regime is probably relevant, and thus no direct impact of the national
unemployment rate is observed.
3 Empirical Investigation
According to the theoretical discussion of the previous section, the empirical study
must take into account dierences of the observed eects of unemployment across
7the wage distribution: due to the joint presence of industry{level wage bargaining and
local wage formation, the wage depressing impact of local unemployment might vanish
when considering workers, who receive low wage payments given their characteristics.
On the other hand, these workers might be more strongly aected by the national
unemployment if this is taken into account in central wage bargaining. Therefore, it is
potentially misleading to focus on the (conditional) mean of the wage distribution as
in standard regression analysis. Rather, the eect of central{wage bargaining on the
wage rigidity should be investigated by means of a quantile regression approach.
A second requirement from the theoretical discussion is to distinguish between regional
and national wage exibility, because there are direct eects of both regional and
national unemployment. However, the theoretical discussion has focused on a set of
employees with sucient similarities to be equally aected by unemployment. As this
seems quite restrictive, the empirical investigation allows for several dierences of both
employees and unemployed. In addition to the locality, employees are classied by age,
education, sex, industry, full{time and part{time employment. A union membership
variable is used in order to identify employment in industries where contract wages
might be higher because of higher union density. Furthermore, unemployed individuals
are characterized by age, education, duration of unemployment, and participation in
training programs.
Before presenting the results, a brief overview of the dataset and a description of the
estimation approach are given in the following next subsections. A detailed description
of the datasets and the manipulations involved can be found in the appendix.
3.1 Dataset
The main database used in this paper is the regional le of the \IAB{Besch

aftigten-
stichprobe" (IABS{REG), which has only recently been made available to the scientic
public (see Hilzendegen, 1996). This dataset is a 1% random sample from the German
social security accounts merged with information on the timing of transfer payments
from the Federal Employment Service during periods of unemployment. The dataset
contains information on 259 districts in West Germany for the time period 1975 to
1990. The industry information in the IABS{REG is restricted to nine one{digit indus-
tries (see Table 2 in the appendix) and there is no information on rm size. In addition
to the IABS{REG, we make also use of the standard le of the \IAB{Besch

aftigten-
stichprobe" (IABS) and the German Microcensus, an annual population survey (see
appendix). The IABS, which provides detailed information on rm size and industry,
is used in order to construct a union density measure across industries. The aggregate
education specic unemployment rates obtained from German Microcensus are used
to correct the non{ employment rates constructed from the IABS{REG such that the
national education specic unemployment rates correspond to their aggregate coun-
8Table 1: Number of Uncensored Cells
a
Quantile (=) 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
Uncensored Cells 43813 43443 42799 41816 39824
a: Number of education{age{district{year cells among 46620 possible cells for
which the respective empirical quantile of the wage distribution is below the
social security threshold.
terparts.
The empirical investigation is based on wage, employment, and unemployment infor-
mation on 259 districts in West Germany during the time period 1976 to 1990. We
omit West Berlin, since it provides a special case for political and geographical reasons.
Also the year 1975 cannot be used, since the disaggregated unemployment information
based on the IABS{REG does not appear reliable for this year (see appendix). We
restrict attention to workers in the age interval 20 to 59 years, because a large fraction
of younger workers are in vocational training receiving low earnings, and the German
pension system involves incentives for early retirement by workers above age 59 such
that the employment rate in this group is fairly low.
The quantile regression approach considered in more detail in the following subsection
is based on grouped data. Namely, we collect all individuals belonging to the same
district, age interval, educational class, and year into a group. Then, we analyze
the determinants of the wage distribution within the cells by means of quantiles,
i.e. for each cell we compute a certain quantile and then study the impact of cell
characteristics, for instance, the cell{specic risk of unemployment. We group the
data into cells dened by three skill groups, four age intervals, 259 districts, and
15 years (1976{1990), yielding at most 46620 cells. Since the wage information in
the IABS{REG is censored from above at the social security threshold, the empirical
analysis only considers uncensored cell quantiles. Table 1 provides the remaining
number of uncensored cells for each quantile considered. The number decreases for
higher quantiles, however, for the 90%{quantile, we still have 85% of all cells available.
As known from other studies (e.g. Fitzenberger / Franz, 1998), censoring is most severe
for high{educated workers and elder workers, thus, we cannot put a lot of condence
in the results obtained for these groups at high quantiles.
3.2 Quantile Regression Approach
In order to investigate the exibility of the entire wage distribution, we estimate quan-
tile regressions (Koenker / Bassett, 1978) of wages in response to dierent unemploy-
ment rates at various quantiles. It is shown in section 2 that the interaction of central
wage bargaining, which results in dierent wage oors for dierent types of workers,
9and rm{specic wage formation can imply changes in coecient estimates at dierent
quantiles. Distinguishing between dierent educational groups and other characteris-
tics, which are associated with the wage level, it seems likely that the wage oors due
to central wage bargaining bind at dierent points in the within{cell wage distribution
for dierent types of workers.
Due to the large number of observations and due to the large number of regres-
sors, we implement the estimation of quantile regressions in a two{step{procedure
rather than having to estimate censored quantile regressions directly (see Fitzen-
berger, 1997, for a survey on censored quantile regressions). The following two{step{
procedure (Minimum{Distance) for discrete regressors has been suggested among oth-
ers by Chamberlain (1994). First, the empirical wage quantiles are determined for each
cell, where the cells are dened by the grouping of all regressor variables. Second, the
uncensored cell quantiles are regressed using a weighted least squares approach on
the respective determinants of wages, which are constant for each cell. Using only
uncensored cells is asymptotically innocuous in the presence of random censoring,
i.e. censoring that is independent of the regressor variables. The second step auto-
matically takes account of the sampling variability in the cell quantiles. Formally, it
involves weighted least squares regressions of the type
q^

(w
r;i
jk) = x
k


+ 

k
; (8)
where k denotes the cell, q^

(w
r;i
jk) the empirical {quantile of (log) wages in cell k, x
k
the regressor which is constant within cells, 

k
the cell and quantile specic error term,
and 

the quantile specic coecient vector. In our empirical application, the average
cell size is about 58 observations which is above the minimum of 30 recommended by
Chamberlain (1994) for the application of the Minimum{Distance method for quantile
regression.
2
Here, cells are dened by education and age of the worker, by the district,
where employment is based, and by the year of observation.
The variance{covariance matrix of the coecient estimates involves heteroscedasticity
due to dierent cell sizes and due to dierences in the within wage distribution. In fact,
even when assuming i.i.d. errors within cells, the variance of 

k
is inversely proportional
to the cell size (analogous to the case of cell means). To account for dierent cell sizes,
in the second step each cell is weighted by the associated total employment in the cell.
However, we do not try to implement a fully ecient GLS procedure, since it depends
critically on the density estimates at the particular cell quantiles (which is notoriously
hard to estimate unless one assumes an i.i.d. within{cell{distribution and cell sizes
are suciently large). In addition, one has to take account of dependencies of the
2
Because the number of workers with medium education level is disproportionately large, 49.7%
of all cells exhibit less than 30 observations. Based on the simulation results in Fitzenberger (1997,
section 4), this is innocuous for two reasons. First, we do not attempt to implement fully ecient
GLS estimation (see next paragraph) requiring a reliable estimate of the variance of the empiri-
cal cell quantiles. And second, we weight each cell in the second step by the cells size eectively
downweighting small cells.
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error terms across cells. Due to the estimation based on cell quantities, conventional
inference procedures (heteroscedasticity{consistent standard errors in our subsequent
application) already take account of dependencies within cells (see Moulton, 1986
and 1990). The regional econometrics literature emphasizes possible dependencies
within a given district (over time and across workers with dierent characteristics)
possibly due to common district eects and also between cells in neighboring districts
possibly due to unobservable spillover eects. In the next subsection, we suggest
a exible Block Bootstrap procedure allowing for inference which is robust against
heteroscedasticity and all mentioned forms of dependencies within districts and across
neighboring districts. Thus, our approach also provides an alternative to deal with
the problem of aggregate regressor variables when used in regressions based on more
disaggregated data (see Moulton, 1990). Presumably, the use of aggregate regressor
variables can result in correlation of the error term across neighboring districts, which
robust inference procedures can take account of. This is also more exible than the
alternatives proposed by Moulton (1986, 1990) since we do not have to impose an
equicorrelation property for the error terms within and across districts.
3.3 Block Bootstrap Procedure for Inference
Robust estimation of the variance{covariance matrix of the two{step coecient esti-
mates has to take account of heteroscedasticity and of the dependency in the error
term across observations. Facing these diculties, we use a exible Block Bootstrap
approach (cf. Fitzenberger, 1998, for the treatment in the time series context). How-
ever, it should be mentioned rst that there exists another great advantage of any
Bootstrap approach in the quantile regression context. Namely, basing the resample
estimates for all quantiles on the same set of resamples also automatically provides an
estimate of the covariance of coecient estimates at dierent quantiles (see Fitzen-
berger, 1997). The Block Bootstrap approach employed here extends the standard
Bootstrap procedure by drawing blocks of observations to form the resamples and
thus retains the dependencies between observations. For each observation in a block,
the entire vector comprising the endogenous variable and the regressors is used, i.e.,
we do not draw from the estimated residuals. When forming the blocks, we use two
versions:
BB1: Blocks of observations containing all education{age{district{year cells for a given
district across time.
BB2: In addition to BB1, also all education{age{district{year cells for the given education{
age{year combination in the neighboring districts are used to form the blocks.
The Block Bootstrap version (BB1) takes account of the correlation of the error term
across educations, age, and time in a given district, which might be due to common
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unobservable district attributes aecting all observations in the district. In addition,
version BB2 takes also account of the possible correlations (spillover eects) in the
error term between neighboring districts. The advantage of these Bootstrap meth-
ods is that even if the associated dependency structure is not present in the data,
inference based on these methods remains valid. Put dierently, constrasting dierent
standard error estimates allows one to infer heuristically, whether the assumed under-
lying dependency structure is important for inference. Previewing the next section,
our results show that correlation within the same district (BB1) proves important
resulting in considerably higher standard error estimates compared to conventional
heteroscedasticity{consistent estimates. However, standard error estimates change
only slightly when switching from BB1 to BB2, i.e. dependency between neighboring
districts does not seem to be of importance for inference.
3.4 Results
Before turning to the interpretation of all quantiles, it is useful to consider the median
regression. Table 3 in the appendix presents estimates from a basic regression. Recall
that we order the observations into groups or cells by year, education, age, and district.
Then, we compute the 50%{quantile, i.e. the median, for all cells and, nally, we
estimate a weighted regression of all cell{medians on various cell characteristics.
For each explanatory variable, the coecient and alternative standard errors are re-
ported (see appendix B for a detailed description of variables). The column denoted by
HC contains conventional heteroscedasticity{consistent standard errors, whereas the
columns BB1 and BB2 contain robust standard errors obtained from Block Bootstrap
estimation as discussed in the previous section. Because BB1{standard errors take
account of correlation within districts and across time, and because they are almost
twice as large as the conventional (HC) standard errors, autocorrelation in time or cor-
relation within a given district and year (Moulton, 1986) eects present in the data.
However, as BB2{standard errors are rarely larger than BB1, there is no indication
for additional dependency between neighboring districts. In the following inference is
based on the BB2 standard errors, since they are robust in a more general sense.
The coecients of the education variables show the expected positive eect, as both
medium (MS) and higher education (HS) raises the level of pay at the median. A higher
share of females (FEMR) and a higher share of part{time employees (PARTR) in the
cell is associated with a lower wage rate. The age dummies (AGE30,AGE40,AGE50)
reveal that elder workers earn higher wages, since the reference category is 20 to 29
years of age. Yet, the age between 30 and 39 (AGE30) shows quite a large relative wage
at the median. It should be emphasized at this point that, since the unemployment
rates are age specic, the coecients do not necessarily show the conventional age{
earnings prole. The union density variable (UD) shows no signicance at the median,
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i.e. industries with higher union membership are not associated with higher median
wages. This might be related to spillover eects of contract wages to other employees.
To capture the eect of unemployment we consider three dierent variables. LUR
denotes the local or cell{specic rate of unemployment corresponding to year, edu-
cation, age, and district. We also employ regional rates of unemployment (RUR),
where for the given year, education, and age (cell{specic) unemployment in both
the district and its neighbors is taken into account. Additionally, national rates of
unemployment (NUR) corresponding to the year, education and age group of the cell
are employed. Whereas the local rate of unemployment is insignicant, the regional
rate of unemployment and the national rate of unemployment corresponding to the
age{education{year cell shows a signicant negative eect at the median. Quantita-
tively, the estimates imply that an increase in the regional rate of unemployment for
a given age{education{year group by one percentage point ceteris paribus involves a
wage decrease of less than one percent (= -.817 %), and an increase of the national un-
employment for this group by one percentage point involves a wage decrease of about
2 percent. Yet, since the estimated coecients are semi{elasticities, the coecients
of regional and national unemployment are dicult to compare. Even when the elas-
ticities are equal the estimated coecients varies with the level of unemployment of
the considered age{education group at regional and national level. The insignicance
of local unemployment is in line with B

uttner (1998), who nds that districts are too
small to be considered as (functional) regional labor markets. And, nally, one might
expect endogeneity to matter less for the unemployment in the region consisting of
the considered district and its neighbors than for unemployment solely in the district.
Table 4 in the appendix contains the regressions not only for the median but for
ve quantiles, namely for the 10%{, 30%{, 50%{, 70%{, and 90%{quantile. Across
quantiles, we nd some remarkable dierences. For instance, medium level education
(MS) shows a similar eect across quantiles, but the eect of higher education (HS) is
largest at the 10%{quantile and decreasing monotonically across the quantiles. This
might be due to the censoring of earnings at the social security threshold, since for
higher educated censoring is most severe. The eects of the shares of females (FEMR)
and of parttime employees (PARTR) vary considerably across the wage distribution.
Turning to coecients of unemployment, we may note rst, that the local rate of
unemployment (LUR) is insignicant not only at the median but also at the other
quantiles. But, the regional (RUR) and national rates of unemployment (NUR) are
signicant at all quantiles. Figure 1 plots the estimated coecients for regional and
national unemployment. Taken literally, the theory of the previous section suggests
that the impact of regional unemployment will vanish at the lower quantiles of the
wage distribution, because for institutional reasons central wage determination may
matter most strongly in this part of the distribution. In fact, the estimated impact
of the regional rate of unemployment (RUR) is found to be lowest at the 10 % quan-
tile. Based on the bootstrap estimate of the variance{covariance matrix we can also
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Figure 1: Impact of Regional and National Unemployment
Notes: Horizontal axis reports the quantiles, vertical axis measures the coecient estimates
as reported in Table 4 in the appendix. Horizontal lines connect the point estimates of the
coecients, vertical lines depict the 95% condence intervals. Using the bootstrap estimate of the
variance{covariance matrix Wald statistics for equality of coecients across quantiles are computed:
Signicance of Dierences:
P-value:
RUR NUR
.165 .000
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test whether the dierences in the coecients across quantiles are signicant. As dis-
played below Figure 1 the joint test fails to show signicant dierences. However,
the dierence between the 10% quantile and the 30% quantile proves to be signicant
(t{statistic: -2.23). On the other hand, the theory predicts a negative impact of na-
tional unemployment at the lower quantiles which is decreasing in absolute value over
the wage distribution. The data support this view, as the strongest negative impact
of national unemployment is found at the 10{% quantile, and the absolute size of
the coecient decreases at higher quantiles. In this case also the joint test supports
dierences across the quantiles.
The time dummies are of importance for the nding of a decreasing impact of national
unemployment across the quantiles. An alternative regression (results are available
upon request), where the set of time dummies was replaced by a cubic trend, did
not show this eect. Here the regression reects the variation of unemployment for
labor with certain education and age characteristics around its long run movement,
whereas with time dummies the national unemployment variable captures deviations
of unemployment for labor with certain education and age characteristics from the
average unemployment for a given year. In the present context the specication with
time dummies is relevant, since we are interested in the impact of unemployment on
the relative wage position within a given year.
To avoid problems of multicollinearity the joint inclusion of regional and national un-
employment of the considered age{skill{year group requires that there is sucient
region{specic variation. One might assume this requirement to be fullled in the
German case, which displays large disparities in regional labor market developments.
But, this point can be made more precise by running regressions of the regional unem-
ployment rates on the national unemployment rates. It turns out (results are available
upon request) that even when considering specic education groups not more than 50
% of the variation of regional unemployment is explained by the national unemploy-
ment rate.
In the basic specication, the impact of cell{specic unemployment on wages was im-
plicitely assumed to be the same across educational levels. This might be too strong
an assumption, since higher qualied employees exhibit higher interregional mobility,
since unemployment varies strongly with the educational level (see Figure 4 in the
appendix), and since the wages of the highly skilled are less likely to be determined
according to the central wage agreements. And, furthermore, the observations of the
highly skilled are much more aected by the censoring in the dataset due to top cod-
ing. Therefore, we allow both regional and national unemployment coecients to dier
with respect to education level. However, we omit the local unemployment rate as it
proved insignicant. Figure 2 focuses on the estimated coecients (see also Table 5 in
the appendix) for the unemployment rate of the unskilled and medium skilled, since
the coecients of the highly skilled are considered less reliable because of the cen-
soring issue. The coecients for the regional rates of unemployment are signicantly
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Figure 2: Skill Specic Impact of Unemployment
Notes: Horizontal axis reports the quantiles, vertical axis measures the coecient estimates as re-
ported in Table 5 in the appendix. Horizontal lines connect the point estimates of the coecients,
vertical lines depict the 95% condence intervals. Using the bootstrap estimate of the variance{
covariance matrix Wald statistics for equality of coecients across quantiles are computed:
Signicance of Dierences (P{value):
RURU RURM NURU NURM
.011 .207 .000 .000
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negative. (RURU) denotes the unemployment rate corresponding to unskilled labor
and RURM refers to the medium skill level. As in the basic specication the impact
of regional unemployment is smaller at the lower quantiles. However, the results are
more pronounced for the low education cells (RURU): whereas at the 30{% quantile
a small but signicant negative coecient is reported, at the 10{% quantile no signif-
icant eect is found. In case of the unskilled even the joint test supports dierences
across quantiles. For medium education (RURM), the dierences are less pronounced,
but the absolute size of the coecient of regional unemployment is lowest at the 10 %
quantile and it diers signicantly from the 30 % quantile (t{statistic: -1.85). Turning
to national unemployment the estimation again shows a negative impact of national
unemployment at the lower quantiles which is weakening over the wage distribution.
According to the results in Table 4 to 6, the union density (UD) shows an interesting
eect on the wage distribution raising the wage at the lower quantile but lowering
the wage at the higher quantile. If we assume that union membership improves the
bargaining position of the union in an industry's wage negotiations it will shift the con-
tract wage (in terms of the model 
2
will rise). This is in line with higher wages at the
lower quantiles. However, at the higher quantiles we would expect no signicant eect
as the negotiated wage is less relevant. Overall, the results show that higher union
density (UD) compresses the within{cell wage dispersion. Following the hypothesis of
an asymmetric impact of unemployment, we should further expect less wage exibility
with respect to regional unemployment and higher exibility with respect to national
unemployment when union density is high (in particular at the lower quantiles). How-
ever, when interacting union density (UD) with the unemployment rates no support
was found as the terms proved insignicant (results are available upon request).
Since the opportunity wage of employed individuals is aected dierently depending
on whether unemployment is short{term or long{term and whether unemployed indi-
viduals participate in publicly sponsored training programs, all of these components
of unemployment could exhibit dierent impacts on wages. As described above, the
IABS{REG dataset allows to distinguish between what can be considered as short{
term and as long{term unemployment and, furthermore, to identify those unemployed
individuals who obtain income maintainance while in continuous training. Under
rm{specic wage formation, short{term unemployment will exert a stronger impact
on wages than long{term unemployment because the long{term unemployed are less
competitive in the labor market (cf. Layard / Nickell / Jackman, 1991). With central
wage negotiations this argument is less convincing, since unions might also represent
the long{term unemployed and thus reduce pressure in negotiations. However, the
share of unemployed receiving income maintainance is expected to have a positive
eect on the contract wages, as part of the cost of unemployment is shifted onto the
public. The results when decomposing unemployment are presented in Table 6 in
the appendix. The main ndings relate to the impact of regional short{term and na-
tional long{term unemployment, which are presented in Figure 3. Whereas regional
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Figure 3: Impacts of Short{ and Long{Term Unemployment
Notes: Horizontal axis reports the quantiles, vertical axis measures the coecient estimates as re-
ported in Table 5 in the appendix. Horizontal lines connect the point estimates of the coecients,
vertical lines depict the 95% condence intervals. Using the bootstrap estimate of the variance{
covariance matrix Wald statistics for equality of coecients across quantiles are computed:
Signicance of Dierences (P{Value):
RSTUU RSTUM NLTUU NLTUM
.006 .116 .000 .000
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long{term unemployment essentially has insignicant eects on wages, short{term
unemployment exerts the predicted inuence. Wage exibility with respect to short{
term unemployment is smallest at the 10{% quantile, even vanishing for the unskilled
(RSTUU). This is in line with the theoretical presumption that local wage formation
matters most at the upper part of the wage distribution. As in the case of regional
unemployment the dierences across quantiles are more pronounced for the unskilled
than for the medium skilled. Turning to the eects of national unemployment, the co-
ecients of national short{term unemployment are mainly insignicant, but national
long{term unemployment exhibits signicant negative eects at the lower quantiles.
Also a positive eect of income maintenance is conrmed at the national level. If
we assume that unions do, in fact, care for those with long term{unemployment, this
nding conforms with the view that central wage formation matters most in the lower
part of the wage distribution.
4 Summary
Although wage rigidity has a prominent position as one of the possible causes of
the European unemployment problem, empirical studies often fail to show that wage
exibility in Europe is signicantly lower than elsewhere. This paper argues that
central wage bargaining as an institutional aspect of wage formation needs to be taken
into account, in order to improve the theoretical understanding as well as the empirical
results on wage exibility.
Based on the German institutional setting, we show theoretically that with the inter-
action of central wage bargaining and local wage formation (due to rm{level wage
bargaining or incentive wages) wage exibility varies across the wage distribution.
Wages in the lower part of the wage distribution are determined mainly by central
wage bargaining, whereas at higher wages, local wage formation is more relevant.
This implies that local wage exibility, measured by the response of wages to regional
unemployment, is more relevant for the higher part of the wage distribution. On the
other hand, if wages negotiated under central wage bargaining respond to national
unemployment, its eects may be found in particular at the lower part of the wage
distribution.
Using the regional le of the \IAB-Besch

aftigtenstichprobe", a 1% random sample
from the German social security accounts, we estimate the response of wages to unem-
ployment across the wage distribution by means of quantile regressions. To estimate
standard errors, we use a Block Bootstrap procedure, which is robust against corre-
lation in time, against dependencies within groups, and against spatial dependencies.
The empirical results on wage exibility conform with our hypothesis. Employees with
low wages given their characteristics have a signicantly lower regional wage exibil-
ity than those with relatively high wages. This eect is particularly relevant for the
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unskilled, as the negative impact of unemployment vanishes at the 10{% quantile of
the wage distribution. When distinguishing short{ and long{term unemployment, we
nd that regional long{term unemployment has a much weaker impact on wages than
short{term unemployment. Regarding short{term unemployment, there is again an
increase of wage exibility over the quantiles except for those with higher education.
We also nd a negative and asymmetric impact of national unemployment on wages,
which is stronger at lower quantiles of the wage distribution. Even national long{term
unemployment is found to have a signicant negative impact especially on wages at
the lower part of the wage distribution.
As a conclusion, our study implies that central wage bargaining matters for regional
wage exibility. In the lower part of the wage distribution, we nd empirical support
for suppressed local wage exibility in the German case. This eect is particularly
relevant for lower educated labor. However, our results suggest that an assessment
of central wage bargaining should also take into account the exibility of wages with
respect to national unemployment. In particular, central wage bargaining may involve
a higher wage exibility for less competitive groups of the labor market.
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A.1 Derivation of Equation (7)
Partial dierentiation of equation (6) with respect to u
r
gives:
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This can be expressed as a product of a marginal density and a conditional probability:
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. Accordingly, the impact of u
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on the probability to observe a wage below c is equal
to 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times the probability to observe a local{wage regime at a given level of the local
wage weighted by the density of that specic local wage. Partial dierentiation of
equation (6) with respect to c gives:
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Again, each of these terms can be expressed as a product of a marginal density with
a conditional probability:
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where f

L and f

C are the marginal densities of 
L
i
and 
C
i
, respectively. The expression
for the dierential of the wage quantile follows by inserting the two partial derivatives
into equation (5), and after replacing the marginal densities of the residuals with the
corresponding marginal densities of the conditional wage distribution.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
In order to prove Proposition 1 it is helpful to reformulate equation (7) yielding:
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In terms of the distribution of the residuals, h (c) can be rewritten using the derivations
in appendix (A.1) above:
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The above proposition holds, if h(c) decreases monotonously from innite values to
zero, when c increases. h (c) is a ratio of two rates of changes in probability for small
increases of the considered wage. In fact, it is the ratio of the rate of change in the
probability of a local{wage regime to the rate of change in the probability of a contract
wage regime. Intuitively, this ratio will fall as c increases, if the probability of a local{
wage regime increases faster than the probability of a contract wage regime. For most
distributions it suces that the marginal density of contract wage residuals f

c
is below
the marginal density of local{wage residuals f

L at the bottom and at the top of the
distribution, such that the marginal densities intersect twice. For distributions dened
over ] 1;+1[ this requirement is implied by a smaller variance of the contract wage
distribution compared to the local wage distribution.
In order to give a rigorous but simple proof consider the case of the uniform distribution
when local and central wage residuals are independent. The two marginal densities
are dened as follows:
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By introducing a lower increment d
l
> 0 and an upper increment d
u
> 0 the distrib-
ution of the local{wage residuals covers a larger interval. Consequently its variance is
smaller than that of the local{wage residuals:
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However, the means of the two distributions need not be equal, as d
u
may dier from
d
l
. The corresponding cumulative densities are:
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:
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The proposition can easily be shown by deriving h as:
h (c) =
c  a+ d
l
c  a
for a < c  b:
On the one hand, with the minimum wage character of contract wages, the distribution
of observed wages is censored at a, i.e. wages can only be observed above a. Thus,
lim
c!a
h (c) =1;
which describes h at the lower end of the observed wage distribution. On the other
hand, for values of c above b the marginal density of the contract wage regime is zero
and the probability that the contract wage is below the observed wage is unity. Thus,
h (c) = 0 for b < c  b+ d
l
;
which describes the top part of the observed wage distribution. Between these two
extreme cases, h(c) declines monotonically with c since
@h
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=  
d
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2
< 0; where: a < c  b:
This proves Proposition 1 in the case of independent uniform distributions.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Similar to the above analysis of the impact of regional unemployment, total dierentia-
tion of equation (4) holding constant regional unemployment and xing the probability
at  gives:
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Partial dierentiation of equation (6) with respect to u gives:
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Accordingly, the impact of u on the probability to observe a wage below c is equal
to 
2
times the probability to observe a contract wage regime at a given level of the
contract wage weighted by the density of that specic contract wage. Inserting into
equation (11) together with equation (9) yields:
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where h (c) is dened as above. The proposition follows by recalling that h(c) is
increasing with c.
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B Variables, Data Sources, and Denitions
The analysis in this paper is based on two main data sources for West Germany: The
regional le of the \IAB{Besch

aftigtenstichprobe" (IABS{REG) and the standard le
IABS. Both datasets are independent 1% random samples from German social secu-
rity accounts during the period from 1975 to 1990 which have only recently been made
available by the research institute of the Federal Employment Service (\Institut f

ur
Arbeitsmarkt{ und Berufsforschung") in N

urnberg. The data are augmented by infor-
mation on unemployment spells of those workers receiving transfer payments from the
Employment Service (\Leistungsempf

angerdatei"). The main features of both datasets
and a users' guide for the IABS can be found in Bender et al. (1996). Specics of the
IABS{REG are described in Hilzendegen (1996). Due to data security requirements,
the datasets are independent samples and dier in terms of the availability of vari-
ables. In this data appendix, we rst give a brief description of variables (symbols in
parentheses). Then we describe the common features of the two main datasets and
nally turn to some specics.
B.1 Variables
Quantiles of wages: Quantiles of the within{cell distribution of logarithms of real daily
wages (deated by the aggregate consumer price index).
(FEMR): Proportion of female employees among all employees in the cell.
(PARTR): Proportion of parttime employees among all employees in the cell.
(ERSi): Proportion of employees in industry i among all employees in the cell (see
Table 2 for the classication of industries).
(AGE20),(AGE30),(AGE40),(AGE50) Dummies for cell specic age in 10{year{inter-
vals: [20  29 years],[30  39 years],[40  49 years],[50  59 years].
(US),(MS),(HS) Dummies for cell specic education: (US): unskilled, i.e. without a
vocational training degree. (MS): medium skilled, i.e. with a vocational training
degree. (HS): high skilled, i.e. with a technical college (\Fachhochschule") or
university degree.
(LURU),(LURM),(LURH): District or local unemployment rates in the respective
education{age{year class, i.e. (LURU): unskilled, (LURM): medium educated,
and (LURH): highly educated. The unemployment rates are computed as non-
employment rates from the data of the IABS{REG, and are corrected by means
of aggregate gures, see below.
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(RURU),(RURM),(RURH): Regional unemployment rates dened as a weighted ave-
rage of unemployment rates for the education{age{year class in the respective
cell in the respective district and in all neighboring districts (neighbors) for the
same education{age{year class. The weights are the total number of persons in
each district for the given education{age{year class.
(NURU),(NURM),(NURH): National unemployment rates dened as a weighted av-
erage of unemployment rates for the education{age{year class in the respective
cell in all districts. The weights are the total number of persons in each district
for the given education{age{year class.
(RSTUU),(RSTUM),(RSTUH): Regional rates of short term unemployed in the re-
spective education{age{year class, constructed in the same way as the regional
unemployment rates. Short term unemployment is identied by the number of
unemployed receiving unemployment benet (\Arbeitslosengeld"), because ben-
et payments are limited to one year.
(RLTUU),(RLTUM),(RLTUGH): Regional rates of long term unemployed in the re-
spective education{age{year class, constructed in the same way as the regional
unemployment rates. Long term unemployment is identied by the number of
unemployed receiving transfer payments (\Arbeitslosenhilfe") but no unemploy-
ment benets, anymore.
(RUIMU),(RUIMM),(RUIMH): Regional rates of unemployed with income mainte-
nance in the respective education{age{year class, constructed in the same way
as the regional unemployment rates. Unemployed with income maintenance are
those participating in continuous training and receiving income maintenance.
(UD): Predicted union density among all employees in the cell, computed as the
weighted average of the aggregate industry specic predicted union density in
each year, where the weights are the industry employment shares (ERSi) in each
cell. Appendix B.4 describes, how the aggregate industry specic union density
is predicted.
B.2 Features of IABS{REG and IABS
Social security contributions are mandatory for employees who earn more than a min-
imum threshold and who are working regularly. The main exemption are civil servants
who do not pay social security contributions at all. Further exclusions from the manda-
tory contributions are students who work less than 20 hours a week on a regular basis
or less than 6 weeks full-time. About 80 percent of the German employees are covered
by this mandatory pension system.
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The basic information in the IABS datasets consists of social security insurance (em-
ployment) spells and unemployment spells. The employment information comprises
the starting and the end point of an employment spell and the average daily gross wage
(excluding employers' contributions). The daily gross wage is censored from above
and truncated from below. If the wage is above the upper social security threshold
(\Beitragsbemessungsgrenze"), the daily social security threshold is reported instead.
If the wage is below the lower social security threshold, the employee does not have
to pay social security contribution and therefore, does not appear in the dataset. An
annual wage observation is calculated as the weighted average of the wage observation
of the individual for all spells within one year where the spell length is used as the
weight. For the subsequent calculations, the annual wage observation is weighted by
the total employment spell length within the year relative to the length of the year.
These weights are used to calculate median wages and raw employment weights for
all individuals in one educational group and industry. Total employment in a cell
dened by various workers' characteristics is obtained by adding up the lenght of all
employment spells within cells. With multiple spells (jobs) at the same time (cf. Ben-
der et al. 1996, p.74), we take the sum of the daily wages across spells as the wage
observation. In case of spells originating from dierent industries, this sum is assigned
to each industry as the wage observation together with an employment weight that is
the product of the ratio between the respective daily wage and the sum of daily wages
times the spell length in years. The latter procedure is based on the assumption that
the respective wage share is a good estimate of the relative time spent in the dierent
jobs and that the hourly wage is the same across jobs.
Over time, the earnings components being subject to the social security tax were
extended (cf. Bender et al. 1996, p. 15). In particular, starting in 1984 one{time
payments to the employee had to be taxed. Steiner / Wagner (1996) note that this
results in a considerable spurious increase in earnings inequality due to the structural
break in the data. Because of this structural break in the data, we corrected the wage
observations before 1983 in a heuristic way. The correction is based on the assumption
that only quantiles above the median need to be corrected upwards before 1983. This
is operationalized for the IABS by a linear regression of wage growth between 1983
and 1984 for the 19 quantiles from 5% to 95%, where wage growth up to the median
is assumed to be constant and on top of this uniform growth for the lower half of the
distribution wage growth for the quantiles above the median is specied as a linear
function in the percentage point dierence between the respective quantile and the
median. We interprete the linear function in the percentage dierence as \excessive"
(spurious) wage growth due to the structural break. For both datasets, wages above
the median before 1983 are corrected upwards by this spurious wage growth. Further
details of this correction can be found in Fitzenberger / Franz (1998, appendix).
Regarding spells of unemployment, the two datasets provide the information on the
time periods during which a person in the dataset receives transfer payments from the
26
Federal Employment Service (\Bundesanstalt f

ur Arbeit") while not working. There
exist three types of transfer payments with dierent eligibility requirements:
(STU): regular unemployment benets (\Arbeitslosengeld") which a worker receives
for a certain time length (typically one year) after becoming unemployed, which
depend on the previous net earnings and which are not means tested
(LTU): unemployment assistance (\Arbeitslosenhilfe") which a worker receives after
the maximum time length for receiving regular unemployment benets is ex-
hausted (typically after one year) and which are means tested
(UIM): income maintenance during participation in a publicly sponsored training pro-
gram
The datasets do not provide information on the size of the transfer payments. Anal-
ogous to the calculation of employment as described above, we obtain measures for
the incidence of each transfer states. Based on the information for the spell length in
a given year, we aggregate the time periods in each of the three transfer states STU,
LTU, and UIM for groups of workers with certain characteristics. A rst raw mea-
sure of the STU{, the LTU{, and the UIM{rate is given by the ratio of the incidence
measure and the total number of person years in a group. We take the incidence of
LTU as a proxy for long{term unemployment and the incidence of UIM as a proxy
for active labor market policy. For our empirical application, we dene total unem-
ployment as the sum of the three transfer states. Below, we will discuss some of the
problems with the raw incidence measure described here and present a correction for
these deciencies.
The IABS{REG dataset contains locational information for 260 consolidated districts
in West Germany and West Berlin. Due to data security requirements, certain districts
among the original 327 districts (\Kreise") had to be combined with neighboring dis-
tricts to avoid districts with less than 100000 inhabitants. For our empirical analysis,
we omit West Berlin leaving us with 259 districts and, for each of these districts, we
determine the group of neighbor districts (rst order neighbors). The IABS{REG has
no information on rm size and only one{digit industries can be distinguished, see the
classication in Table 2.
B.3 Computation of Unemployment Rates
Given that the IAB{Besch

aftigtenstichprobe is drawn randomly from the population
of social security accounts, unemployment is underrepresented in the dataset. A fur-
ther problem with the district data consists of the fact that the regional information
is rst provided by the rst employment spell and that the location information in un-
employment spells is taken from previous employment spells. Therefore, we calibrate
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Table 2: Industry Classication in IABS{REG
a
No. Industry
German English
01 Land{ und Forstwirtschaft, Agriculture, Forestry,
Tierhaltung und Fischerei Animals and Fisheries
04 Energiewirtschaft, Wasserversorgung, Energy, Water,
Bergbau und Verarbeitendes Gewerbe Mining and Manufacturing
46 Baugewerbe Construction
50 Handel Trade
53 Verkehr und Nachrichten

ubermittlung Transport and Communication
59 Kreditinstitute und Versicherungsgewerbe Banking and Insurance
63 Dienstleistungen, soweit Other Services
anderweitig nicht genannt
70 Gebietsk

orperschaften und Sozialversicherungen Government
73 Organisationen ohne Erwerbscharakter Non{Prot Organizations
und Private Haushalte and Private Households
a: The industry classication used in this paper uses the classication given by the IABS{
REG dataset. The numbers refer to the classication numbers used in the National Ac-
counts of the German Statistical Oce (\Statistisches Bundesamt", FS 18, R 1.3).
the raw unemployment rates such that after aggregating the entire sample the annual
education{specic unemployment rates correspond to the rates depicted in Figure 4.
When explicitely aggregating the raw unemployment rate from the IABS{REG for
the three educational groups (US,MS,HS), the estimate is extremely poor for the
year 1975 where the aggregate rate in Figure 4 is between 30 and 86 times higher
compared to the rate from the IABS{REG. However, after 1975 this factor decreases
considerably and lies between 3 and 0.75. Thus, we omit the year 1975 in our further
analysis, since it is unlikely that we can construct reliable unemployment rates for
specic socioeconomic groups in that year and, for each of the years 1976 to 1990, we
correct all unemployment rates (unemployment, STU, LTU, and UIM) by multiplying
the rates for each socioeconomic group with the year and education{specic factor by
which the education{specic unemployment rate is underestimated after aggregation.
German Microcensus data on education{specic employment and unemployment are
taken from \Bev

olkerung und Erwerbst

atigkeit", Fachserie 1, Reihe 4.1.2 by the Fed-
eral Statistical Oce (Statistisches Bundesamt). These data are available for the
years 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1985, 1988, and 1990. When calculating education{
specic unemployment rates for the missing years, we interpolate the data using
a regression approach where the aggregate unemployment rate is used to predict
the period specic movement. The Microcensus distinguishes between three labor
market states: Employed (\Erwerbst

atig"), Unemployed (\Erwerbslos"), and Non-
participating (\Nichterwerbsperson"). The state Unemployed does not necessarily
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correspond to the notion of \registered Unemployment" used by the Federal Em-
ployment Service (\Bundesanstalt f

ur Arbeit"). Whereas the conventional aggregate
unemployment rate refers to registered unemployment and employees during the entire
year, the Microcensus only provides data on employment and unemployment for one
point of time in the month of April. In addition, the denitions of unemployment and
employment dier slightly. Therefore, the aggregate unemployment rate depicted in
Figure 4 does not necessarily correspond to a weighted average of education{specic
unemployment rates.
Figure 4: Trends in Education Specic Unemployment Rates
B.4 Using the IABS to Predict Union Density
In West Germany, conventional industry specic measures of union density (ratio of
union members to employment) typically cannot distinguish between working and non{
working members (cf. Franz, 1996, chapter 7.2). Also the industry aliation of the
unions does not necessarily correspond to standard industry classications and some
unions cover large groups of industries. The recent study Fitzenberger / Haggeney /
Ernst (1998) estimates union membership based on individual data from the German
Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP). The GSOEP provides the membership information
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for the years 1985, 1989, and 1993. The results of the study show that the econo-
metric specication of union membership is stable across the three available years.
One specication of these estimates for the unbalanced panel of observations in the
GSOEP contains only variables, which are available in the IABS (we only neglect the
signicant inuence of political preferences). This specication is used to predict union
membership rates among all employed workers in 46 industries for the years 1975 to
1990 (for further details see Fitzenberger / Haggeney / Ernst, 1998). Given the esti-
mated probit membership function, it proves very important to base the prediction on
detailed industry and rm size information, which is provided in the IABS but not in
the IABS{REG. The rm size information is only available after 1976. For the years
1975 and 1976, we take the same size class for each rm as provided for the rst ob-
servation on the same rm after 1976. If there is no observation for a rm after 1976,
we take the lowest rm size class, since rm attrition is likely to be negatively corre-
lated with rm size. The industry classication diers slightly from the one used in
the national account data. The IABS comprises 95 industries which, in most cases, is
ner than the national account classication used for the prediction (see Fitzenberger
/ Franz, 1998 how to merge the two). It proceeds as follows: First, the IABS data for
each year is grouped in cells dened by the explanatory variables of the membership
functions except for rm size
3
and earnings. Second, for each cell the median wage
and the average shares of each rm size category is calculated. Third, based on the
cell attributes and the variables calculated in the second step, we predict the union
density in the cell by the associated tted membership probability. Fourth, the union
densities across cells are aggregated for each industry in the IABS{REG (see Table 2)
and for each year by calculating the weighted average across the respective cells where
the weights correspond to the employment in each cell. In light of the German wage
bargaining institutions, it seems reasonable to refer to industry{specic union density
rates at the national level when predicting the cell specic union density, since despite
a possible regional variation in union density, there exists almost no regional variation
in bargained wages which are the result of central wage bargaining for a given industry.
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D Tables
Table 3: Median Regression Estimates (1976{1990)
standard errors standard errors
Variable Coe. HC BB1 BB2 Variable Coe. HC BB1 BB2
Intercept 4.891 .373 .601 .593 DY82 .032 .008 .008 .009
MS .120 .007 .009 .009 DY83 .111 .011 .012 .012
HS .471 .010 .013 .013 DY84 .126 .013 .015 .015
FEMR -.586 .043 .104 .093 DY85 .034 .011 .013 .013
PARTR -.571 .085 .207 .188 DY86 .026 .015 .021 .021
AGE30 .101 .003 .004 .004 DY87 .041 .019 .027 .028
AGE40 .027 .004 .007 .007 DY88 .034 .027 .041 .041
AGE50 .044 .005 .008 .008 DY89 .029 .033 .051 .051
UD -.016 .019 .030 .030 DY90 .057 .031 .058 .047
LUR -.097 .059 .083 .082 ERS04 .349 .367 .590 .548
RUR -.817 .096 .169 .163 ERS46 -.684 .084 .202 .183
NUR -1.992 .145 .205 .208 ERS50 .245 .102 .212 .199
DY77 .024 .006 .008 .009 ERS53 .904 .405 .653 .644
DY78 .038 .005 .005 .006 ERS59 .539 .129 .324 .289
DY79 .050 .007 .009 .010 ERS63 .095 .133 .246 .239
DY80 .051 .006 .005 .006 ERS70 -.487 .197 .358 .346
DY81 .047 .006 .005 .006 ERS73 .627 .161 .317 .301
Notes: Coecient estimates obtained from weighted least squares regressions of empirical cell
quantiles on the set of regressors varying by 42799 year{education{age{district cells. HC:
Heteroscedasticity{consistent standard error estimates. BB1: Block Bootstrap standard
error estimates taking account of the dependency across all observations within a given
district within a year and over time (based on 1000 resamples). BB2: Block Bootstrap
standard error estimates additionally taking account of the dependency between the district
and all its rst order neighbors within a given year (based on 1000 resamples).
Table 4: Quantile Regression Estimates (1976{1990)
 = 0:1  = 0:3  = 0:5  = 0:7  = 0:9
Variable Coe. (s.e.) Coe. (s.e.) Coe. (s.e.) Coe. (s.e.) Coe. (s.e.)
Intercept 2.848 (.895) 3.630(.720) 4.891(.593) 5.754(.461) 6.177(.647)
MS -.031 (.017) .075(.012) .120(.009) .158(.007) .215(.009)
HS .565 (.025) .520(.017) .471(.013) .418(.011) .324(.013)
FEMR -.315 (.122) -.487(.110) -.586(.093) -.622(.093) -.615(.103)
PARTR -.833 (.227) -.874(.224) -.571(.188) -.446(.188) -.417(.207)
AGE30 -.083 (.007) .030(.006) .101(.004) .148(.005) .171(.006)
continued on next page
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 = 0:1  = 0:3  = 0:5  = 0:7  = 0:9
Variable Coe. (s.e.) Coe. (s.e.) Coe. (s.e.) Coe. (s.e.) Coe. (s.e.)
AGE40 -.150 (.011) -.062(.009) .027(.007) .103(.007) .144(.009)
AGE50 -.068 (.013) -.018(.010) .044(.008) .096(.007) .109(.009)
UD .058 (.045) .042(.036) -.016(.030) -.056(.023) -.075(.033)
LUR -.046 (.107) -.081(.091) -.097(.082) -.037(.071) .020(.080)
RUR -.461 (.196) -.796(.179) -.817(.163) -.738(.159) -.782(.181)
NUR -3.108 (.298) -2.546(.236) -1.992(.208) -1.419(.194) -.704(.240)
ERS04 -.922 (.866) -.731(.700) .349(.575) 1.093(.459) 1.473(.643)
ERS46 -.074 (.233) -.485(.205) -.684(.183) -.877(.171) -1.008(.191)
ERS50 .357 (.256) .382(.226) .245(.199) .160(.171) .238(.206)
ERS53 -.834(1.000) -.317(.788) .904(.644) 1.640(.541) 2.311(.781)
ERS59 1.142 (.368) 1.088(.328) .539(.289) .543(.279) .681(.334)
ERS63 .639 (.333) .478(.281) .095(.239) -.112(.206) -.075(.266)
ERS70 -1.008 (.469) -1.105(.410) -.487(.346) -.105(.296) -.037(.376)
ERS73 1.080 (.420) .831(.330) .627(.301) .035(.296) -.405(.387)
Notes: Coecient estimates obtained from weighted least squares regressions of empirical
cell quantiles on the set of regressors varying by 43813 to 39824 year{education{age{district
cells depending on the quantile (see text). A full set of time dummies is included. Block
Bootstrap standard error estimates (BB2) in parentheses take account of the dependency
across all observations within a given district within a year and over time and between the
district and all its rst order neighbors in the given year (based on 1000 resamples).
Table 5: Quantile Regression Estimates (1976{1990)
 = 0:1  = 0:3  = 0:5  = 0:7  = 0:9
Variable Coe. (s.e.) Coe. (s.e.) Coe. (s.e.) Coe. (s.e.) Coe. (s.e.)
Intercept 2.643(.892) 3.503(.713) 4.811(.570) 5.707(.459) 6.146(.657)
MS .140(.018) .168(.014) .148(.010) .156(.009) .160(.010)
HS .686(.035) .474(.026) .340(.022) .222(.019) .116(.021)
FEMR -.313(.120) -.491(.110) -.595(.091) -.632(.091) -.626(.103)
PARTR -.831(.227) -.864(.224) -.553(.188) -.425(.182) -.398(.206)
AGE30 -.105(.007) .017(.006) .095(.005) .145(.005) .175(.005)
AGE40 -.231(.012) -.102(.010) .017(.009) .106(.007) .172(.008)
AGE50 -.111(.013) -.038(.010) .039(.009) .098(.007) .123(.008)
UD .072(.045) .050(.036) -.011(.029) -.053(.023) -.074(.033)
RURU -.141(.180) -.528(.159) -.559(.158) -.415(.166) -.477(.207)
RURM -.924(.305) -1.312(.218) -1.395(.173) -1.270(.158) -1.189(.186)
RURH -1.009(.451) -1.268(.248) -1.232(.222) -1.153(.207) -1.141(.200)
NURU -4.564(.319) -3.380(.265) -2.404(.234) -1.679(.212) -.563(.265)
continued on next page
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 = 0:1  = 0:3  = 0:5  = 0:7  = 0:9
Variable Coe. (s.e.) Coe. (s.e.) Coe. (s.e.) Coe. (s.e.) Coe. (s.e.)
NURM -9.053(.614) -5.367(.403) -2.321(.327) -.716(.276) 1.853(.308)
NURH -10.006(.858) -2.773(.517) 1.513(.477) 4.273(.419) 6.493(.488)
Notes: The coecients for the employment proportion in the dierent industries are not
displayed. For further notes see table 4.
Table 6: Quantile Regression Estimates (1976{1990)
 = 0:1  = 0:3  = 0:5  = 0:7  = 0:9
Variable Coe. (s.e.) Coe. (s.e.) Coe. (s.e.) Coe. (s.e.) Coe. (s.e.)
Intercept 2.434 (.881) 3.397 (.716) 4.770 (.573) 5.733 (.457) 6.232 (.644)
MS .209 (.026) .248 (.019) .228 (.015) .237 (.015) .229 (.015)
HS .860 (.048) .641 (.030) .453 (.025) .292 (.022) .115 (.021)
FEMR -.306 (.119) -.461 (.105) -.568 (.087) -.600 (.085) -.582 (.094)
PARTR -.813 (.225) -.877 (.221) -.564 (.187) -.442 (.178) -.429 (.199)
AGE30 .078 (.011) .154 (.008) .168 (.006) .162 (.005) .139 (.005)
AGE40 .067 (.017) .126 (.011) .147 (.009) .141 (.007) .125 (.007)
AGE50 .245 (.017) .256 (.011) .226 (.009) .172 (.008) .107 (.008)
UD .059 (.044) .036 (.036) -.021 (.029) -.061 (.023) -.079 (.033)
RSTUU .212 (.313) -.614 (.265) -.568 (.245) -.678 (.245) -.933 (.270)
RSTUM -1.136 (.481) -2.081 (.433) -2.050 (.353) -2.113 (.339) -2.379 (.405)
RSTUH -1.396 (.531) -1.854 (.407) -1.866 (.417) -1.406 (.324) -1.170 (.316)
RLTUU -.281 (.312) -.445 (.270) -.474 (.255) -.099 (.278) .036 (.322)
RLTUM -.018 (.706) -.391 (.563) -.664 (.442) -.573 (.410) -.298 (.488)
RLTUH -.738 (.645) -1.069 (.417) -.984 (.401) -1.370 (.345) -1.393 (.309)
RUIMU .432(1.204) 3.623 (.927) 2.607 (.798) 1.921 (.750) 1.004 (.843)
RUIMM -6.090(1.689) -2.127(1.216) -2.008 (.946) -.390 (.795) .598 (.929)
RUIMH -1.496(1.644) -.773 (.927) -.425 (.714) .299 (.586) .123 (.728)
NSTUU .518 (.718) .945 (.540) .316 (.451) .286 (.401) .021 (.434)
NSTUM .305(1.142) .867 (.874) -.280 (.736) -1.269 (.672) -1.499 (.861)
NSTUH 1.545(2.317) 1.568(1.566) 4.352(1.363) 4.165(1.087) 4.558(1.233)
NLTUU -12.988 (.713) -12.090 (.528) -9.516 (.445) -7.516 (.459) -4.796 (.544)
NLTUM -26.810(1.545) -19.523 (.981) -11.013 (.752) -4.871 (.658) 2.027 (.879)
NLTUH -28.260(1.858) -21.120(1.449) -14.139(1.314) -7.752(1.063) -1.283(1.078)
NUIMU 24.820(2.139) 27.746(1.758) 24.513(1.579) 17.886(1.316) 14.387(1.379)
NUIMM 21.570(3.803) 16.766(2.717) 12.250(2.145) 1.902(1.702) -2.539(2.011)
NUIMH -10.100(6.765) 25.586(5.459) 27.534(3.572) 29.900(3.782) 29.921(3.618)
Notes: The coecients for the employment proportion in the dierent industries are not
displayed. For further notes see table 4.
